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Resilience is an increasingly popular concept used to explore how systems respond to various 
challenges. It has been actively used in International Relations. Here, resilience has been 
analyzed in predominantly postmodernist terms. Yet, I take resilience-thinking, as explored 
by one of its leading scholars, David Chandler, and show that it has some affinities with 
political realism, understood, contra stereotypes, as a complex tradition of political reflection. 
I also apply the insights gained to the recent overarching turn to resilience in the EU’s external 
action. The article demonstrates that the novel stress of resilience-thinking on the complexity 
of the contemporary world is very important, but that it is useful to contextualize it and relate 
it, if in part, to the age-old concerns of the realist tradition, and to identify similar strengths and 
problems in both approaches. Both resilience-thinking and realism have drawn our attention 
to the plural aspect of politics. However, they may face problems concerning elements of 
relativism, a claim to know the ‘reality’ best, the use of fixed categories, irresponsibility, and 
the reification of an understanding of reality as a permanent crisis. All these strengths and 
problems will likely play out in the EU’s external action and even its internal development.
Keywords: resilience, political realism, International Relations theory, European Union.
‘Resilience’ is a concept quickly getting traction in International Relations (IR). It is 
common to trace its path into IR from ecology, especially following the influential inter-
pretation of Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper [1]. As a distinctive term in ecology, re-
1 The research was supported by the grant of the Russian Science Foundation (project No 17-18-
01110).
2 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for useful comments.
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silience was introduced by Crawford Holling in 1973. Holling distinguished between, and 
even opposed, ‘stability’ and ‘resilience’ of ecological systems: the former meant simply 
‘the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium state’ following a shock, and ‘resilience’ 
was understood as ‘a measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb 
change and disturbance’ while keeping its key features [2, p. 14]. According to Holling, 
a system may be very unstable, but it is its very instability that may uphold its resilience 
[2, p. 14–15]. Some authors note that ‘resilience’ has been widely used in various other 
disciplines, all of which have influenced the ways ‘resilience’ has been understood in IR. 
For instance, Philippe Bourbeau mentions psychological understandings of resilience, re-
silience as applied to materials, and resilience in the field of social work, besides ecology 
[3, p. 24–31].
While there is no consensus in IR on resilience’s sources and definition, resilience’s 
general idea relates to how systems of different kinds react to shocks and, while sometimes 
changing to certain degrees, uphold their character. To give but a few examples, scholars 
may speak of resilience as a feature of cities or critical infrastructures, or the resilience of 
a political regime, or resilience as a neoliberal discourse (for recent overviews of the state 
of the application of ‘resilience’ within IR, see, e. g., [3; 4]). 
Resilience is also an important concept in the policy discourses of numerous interna-
tional actors. Notably, it has been declared one of the main goals of the European Union’s 
external action (see above all [5; 6]). Resilience has thus become a pervasive category of 
theory and practice. 
Yet, for all of resilience’s popularity, there remains an unexplored but important av-
enue for research. To my knowledge, no analysis of resilience in connection with political 
realism has been undertaken. Discussions of resilience within IR are now a preserve of 
approaches that analyze it in postmodernist terms. All of these approaches together, while 
certainly varied, are perceived to be opposed to or simply disconnected from political 
realism. These approaches are deemed to belong to a different, or even incommensura-
ble, disciplinary ‘compartment’. Nevertheless, in this article, my aim is to uncover some 
existing parallels between ‘resilience-thinking’, at least as analyzed by David Chandler [7], 
and realism (without equating them, to be sure). My theoretical arguments are above all 
intended as general, but I also illustrate them by analyzing how the linkages between real-
ism and resilience-thinking may advance the current debates on the European Union’s 
external action.
Theories of resilience are no doubt varied. In this article, I focus on resilience-think-
ing as explored by David Chandler. Chandler’s account was selected for the following rea-
sons. In general, Chandler sees resilience as a multifaceted notion that cannot be simply 
considered as an ideological tool of a supposedly univocal ‘neoliberalism’. Given the often 
expressed criticisms of resilience as purely neoliberal, Chandler’s take on it seems more 
nuanced. Resilience as the broad idea of the survival of various systems is not one-sided 
per se, and it can and should be studied from different perspectives. Moreover, to our 
knowledge, Chandler has been the first to offer a coherent and philosophically sophisti-
cated book-length analysis of resilience in IR [7]. He has also been the editor of the single 
academic journal specifically dealing with resilience in IR [8]. Chandler sees in resilience-
thinking a whole new overarching theoretical vision. Chandler’s account of resilience is 
an especially fruitful subject to analysis and critique: while it would have been easier to 
criticize one-sided accusations against resilience as necessarily a ‘bad neoliberal idea’, it 
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is more promising to engage with Chandler’s more complex arguments. It should also be 
kept in mind that Chandler himself is critical towards some of resilience-thinking’s as-
pects, and it is also clear that his analysis cannot be ‘the last word’ on resilience-thinking. 
Below, I will show that resilience-thinking, as analyzed by Chandler, has both strengths 
and weaknesses. And even his rich and multifaceted account does not connect resilience 
to realism. Thus, Chandler’s approach has been selected here not because I completely 
agree with either his analysis of resilience-thinking or with this kind of resilience-thinking 
itself, but because his approach has been anyway influential in IR, and a multifaceted one, 
providing a good avenue for interpreting the resilience concept.
In its turn, by realism I mean a broad and long-standing tradition of philosophical 
and political reflection. I will argue that this tradition is much richer than stereotypical 
descriptions that have come to associate realism with simplistic materialism, positivism, 
cynicism, an apologia of stasis, or a simplistic state-centric approach (for criticisms of 
these stereotypes, see, e. g., [9]). Indeed, this is a tradition whose distinguishing focus may 
be defined as follows: realism has been critical of simplistic rationalism and understood 
politics as a domain which cannot be fully subject to substantively rational unity, com-
prehension or improvement. This seems to be the broadest common denominator under 
which most realists may be subsumed, despite the well-known differences between vari-
ous realist approaches.
This article is intended to make two main contributions. First, it will show that resil-
ience-thinking should not be studied from a single perspective. The novelty of other au-
thors’ works has been to point to the need to explore resilience’s connections to disciplines 
beyond ecology and to intellectual positions beyond neoliberalism [3; 10]. Accordingly, 
this article’s novelty in connecting resilience to realism is intended to be at least not inferi-
or to theirs’. Second, this is not just another direction to broaden the debate for the sake of 
broadening. I will claim that relating resilience-thinking to realism helps to better under-
stand both. The objection that any two intellectual viewpoints may be related would miss 
the point that resilience-thinking and realism are kindred in truly important respects. Re-
silience may indeed be studied better if presented not as a totally ‘new’ approach unrelated 
to previous ones, but as one that has some features that have been explored for centuries of 
discussions within and around realism. The richness of these discussions should not be ig-
nored in analyses of resilience. At the same time, the article contributes to the increasingly 
popular rereading of realism, which aims at recovering it from its stereotypical depictions. 
The article’s contributions may advance IR theory and European studies.
The article is structured as follows. I begin by briefly introducing the relevant lit-
eratures, unpacking Chandler’s definition of resilience, and outlining some preliminaries 
regarding why realism may be compared with it. Next, I continue the comparison in more 
detail by showing some ontological and epistemological affinities between resilience-
thinking and realism. Next, I take stock of some strengths and problems of resilience-
thinking and realism. Finally, I offer an illustration related to the EU’s external action, 
followed by a conclusion.
Relating resilience-thinking and realism: setting the stage
An analysis of the literature on resilience reveals two basic strands, none of which 
has engaged with realism. On the one hand, perhaps the widest strand in the literature 
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simply criticizes resilience for being little more than a neoliberal ideological device. These 
works mostly follow Walker and Cooper’s idea that resilience has become so pervasive in 
political discourse because, ideologically, it chimes well ‘with a neoliberal philosophy of 
complex adaptive systems’ found in some works of Friedrich Hayek [1, p. 144]. Authors 
within this strand offer Foucault-inspired (yet quite simplistic) critiques of resilience, de-
nouncing it as a neoliberal governmentality that preaches the virtues of self-reliance and 
the market economy (for a recent example, see [11]). 
On the other hand, authors in the second strand have seen these repeated one-sid-
ed ‘Foucauldian’ criticisms of resilience as ‘monotone’ and ‘unsatisfying’ [10, p. 419; see 
also 3]. Ironically, while genealogical and Foucauldian readings of resilience should have 
been by their very nature flexible, multifaceted and open, many of them have become 
largely dogmatic. They postulate the single ‘correct’ source and meaning of resilience and 
condemn it as a certain neoliberal bogeyman (for criticisms, see [3, p. 20–24; 10]). But, 
certainly, Foucauldian approaches may be more nuanced, and the various meanings and 
cases of neoliberalism also require more nuanced understandings. Moreover, scholars in 
the second strand of the literature have offered alternative conceptualizations of resilience. 
For example, Jessica Schmidt argues that resilience is best understood as dovetailing with 
Deweyan pragmatism. Therefore, Schmidt believes resilience is not a continuation of neo-
liberalism, but rather a way out of what she thinks are neoliberalism’s internal contradic-
tions (see [10]). Relating resilience to pragmatism is indeed but a step from relating it to 
realism. Still, neither Schmidt nor other scholars have made such a step. Both strands in 
the literature on resilience, by and large, treat it in postmodernist terms. But at least, schol-
ars in the second strand, compared to the first one, point to the possibility of resilience’s 
various interpretations. It is to the second strand that David Chandler also belongs. More-
over, within this strand, his analysis of resilience-thinking is one of the most extensive and 
interesting, and it seems therefore especially fruitful to relate it to realism.
Regarding realism, I join those authors who increasingly see it as a tradition that is, 
contra stereotypes, strongly aware of the importance of ideas, ethics and change (see, e. g., 
[9; 12–19]). Certainly, it would be impossible to analyze in a single article all of realism, 
whose broad and varied nature I readily acknowledge. My aim here is only to stress some 
fundamental themes that have run through much of realism. I have to select those authors 
who seem the most philosophically rich and representative of the respective stages of the 
realist tradition, with a focus on academic IR realism. To repeat, I suggest that realism’s 
defining features refer to its critiques of simplistic rationalism and to its understanding 
of politics as a domain which cannot be fully subject to substantively rational unity, com-
prehension or improvement. Beside its fundamental philosophical features, realism has 
of course long stressed such more concrete themes as balance of power or survival. These 
features were quite evident in thinkers whom we can understand as realist since ancient 
Greece and up to the classical realists of the 20th century. The themes have also resurfaced 
in those current works that revive the legacy of some of the classical realists. Moreover, 
and contrary to established views about the neorealist varieties of realism, some authors 
argue that even neorealism cannot be unambiguously equated with positivism or with 
rationality (see, e. g., [20]). Regarding neoclassical realism, I do not think that it has intro-
duced in the realist tradition any fundamental philosophical changes that go beyond the 
defining features of realism. When defining realism, I am not trying to arbitrarily pick up 
those themes that will confirm my arguments. Neither am I picking up themes that would 
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be peripheral to realists, given that many of them have espoused varied ideas. The themes 
that are analyzed are fundamental to and constantly reemerge in realism, as I show with 
references to numerous students of realism. And it is these themes that converge with 
resilience-thinking. Certainly, suggesting some ‘transhistorical’ traits of realism (and of 
any other tradition) is an idealizing exercise. I do not deny differences within realism. But 
if we can meaningfully speak about any long-standing tradition in the history of ideas at 
all, it would be necessary to identify its recurrent themes. Relating academic realists since 
1919 to their early modern forerunners such as Hobbes or even to the distant ancients 
such as Thucydides has been standard for realism’s own self-presentation. And the same 
has been done by such penetrating students of realism as Michael Williams [13] or Rich-
ard Ned Lebow [12].
Let us now outline some preliminaries regarding why realism and resilience-thinking 
may be compared. David Chandler does not provide a single literal definition of resilience. 
Rather, he tries to unpack the notion throughout his book. As we will see, his vision of 
resilience largely emerges as a combination of the main themes of postmodernism applied 
to the general idea of resilience as systemic survival. The main elements of Chandler’s 
understanding of resilience are as follows. Resilience refers to rejecting modernity’s ‘lin-
ear modes of governing and understanding’ [7, p. 13]. It recognizes the ‘complexity’ of 
the contemporary world where some ‘failures’ are inevitable, but governance should learn 
from them [7, p. 13]. Chandler clearly lends resilience a practical, pragmatic aspect: it is 
not only a theory, but also ‘a mode of… acting in the world’ [7, p. 13]. Resilience is not 
about ‘liberal modernist politics of representation’ or mastery over politics; it is instead 
about ‘governing through the ‘reality’ of processes and relations’ [7, p. 13]. 
Resilience is given a very high theoretical status. In Chandler’s terms, it is ‘an emerg-
ing conceptual paradigm’ [7, p. 47, italics added]. Moreover, resilience is said to be nothing 
less than ‘the first post-liberal or post-modern episteme’ [7, p. 47].
But it is doubtful that resilience-thinking can claim such a high status. Already the 
few elements cited above sound as quite familiar realist themes. Even Chandler himself 
has some reservations about their novelty. Thus, he grants that the thesis ‘that today we 
live in a globalised and complex world’ is considered ‘a truism’ [21, p. 175]. I cannot help 
but agree: this is a truism. And as such, it has been given much attention in a number of 
approaches other than resilience-thinking. But the truism of the complexity of the social 
world may also be misleading if it is read as though only the current world were somehow 
complex, while previously society had been ‘simple’. It seems more fruitful to recognize 
that human society has always been complex, in any case much more complex than un-
conscious physical systems. And this complexity has precisely been an important preoc-
cupation of penetrating realists. Certainly, almost any other theory also recognizes that 
the social world is complex, in a sense. But resilience-thinking and realism converge in 
their explicit discussion of and emphasis on complexity and limits to control in politics. 
And much as resilience-thinking, realists do not simply treat ‘complexity’ as a broad meta-
phor, but base their views of complexity on the ideas of modern science, including systems 
theory (see below). 
Chandler acknowledges that resilience is not the first approach to oppose ‘the reality 
of complex life against the artifice of human social construction’ [7, p. 204]. The novelty, 
for Chandler, lies in that complexity is not simply ‘the limit to’ governance — it is taken 
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to be the foundation of governance [7, p. 204]. Yet, the similar theme of having to govern 
within the reality of complexity is also quite familiar for realism. 
Chandler also recognizes, in a note, that some philosophers of science have for more 
than a century challenged ‘the hubris of reason’ and ‘‘ ‘mechanical’ materialism” [7, p. 199, 
note 15]. In its critique of rationalism, resilience-thinking is thus also not very novel. 
Chandler grants that well before Bruno Latour and William Connolly, critiques of sim-
plistic materialism and mechanicalism were presented by, for example, Edmund Husserl 
or Martin Heidegger [7, p. 199, note 15]. This is true; but Chandler quite predictably limits 
himself to such fashionable lines of thought as those running through Husserl, Heidegger, 
Latour, or Connolly. No mention is made of the realist tradition. But in fact, the realist 
tradition from Thucydides to Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau may very well 
be compared to, say, some aspects in Heidegger or other similar thinkers who have been 
critical of rationalism and stressed ‘the ineliminability of tragedy’ in politics (see, e. g., [15, 
p. 136]). Contrary to stereotypes, neither Hobbes, nor Morgenthau [13, p. 19–51, 82–127], 
nor even Waltz [20, p. 14–15] were positivists. Chandler also refers to Robert Jervis’s well-
known work on complexity (see [7, p. 92, note 1, p. 237; 22]). But Jervis is again typical of 
neorealism, which certainly insisted on its own scientific status, but which, as the previous 
realists, still considered both scientific and political rationality as quite circumscribed and 
relative to subjective perspectives (see [20, p. 8, 18, footnote 81, p. 20–22]).
Chandler acknowledges as well that resilience-thinking is connected to pragmatist 
philosophy, e. g., to that of John Dewey (see [7, p. 53; 23; 24, p. 86–87, 89, note 1]). Other 
scholars have also increasingly stressed the links between resilience-thinking and pragma-
tism [10; 25]. Again, no reference to realism is made. To turn to pragmatism has in general 
become ‘trendy’ in IR. But the evident links between pragmatism and realism have been as 
if hidden in plain sight for those concerned with resilience. For example, both ‘the Real-
ist ethics of responsibility’ and ‘a Pragmatist ethics of phronesis’ revolve around ‘context, 
practicality and consequentiality’ [16, p. 785]. Examining all other connections between 
realism and pragmatism would be much beyond the article’s scope: I presume that they 
are quite evident (some of them are indicated below; for details on the topic, see, e. g. 
[16]). Suffice it to stress that the connections between resilience-thinking and pragmatism 
recently identified by some authors only add evidence of the connections of the former to 
realism.
Thus, Chandler himself grants that some aspects of resilience are not novel or gives 
hints that help us to adumbrate the connections between resilience-thinking and realism.
Again, the realism that I refer to is not a stereotypical realism developed by some 
self-described realists in IR and used as a foil by their critics. Even a cursory rereading of 
the classics will show that, for example, Thucydides offered us a “ ‘tragic narrative’ ”, that 
Machiavelli stressed ‘the fickleness of Fortuna’, or that Augustine depicted ‘the mad-dash 
strivings of peoples… to achieve a happiness that always eludes them’ [17, p. 417]. Large-
ly the same themes resurfaced in Morgenthau, sometimes very explicitly (see especially 
[26]). It would be mistaken to equate the whole of realism with rationalism or materialism 
(see, e. g., [18]). True, especially in the works of many neorealists, the scepticism of their 
classical predecessors was muted. But as I will show, it was not absent, and it also reso-
nated with resilience-thinking.
Writing in 2014, Chandler largely presented resilience as the response to the end 
of the Cold War, of the Left-Right divide, and of liberal approaches (see [7, p. 23, 184]). 
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Basically, resilience is presented as the dominant reaction to the crumbling of the old 
certainties and old debates. But a similar role has traditionally been claimed by realism. It 
seems possible to read, for instance, Thucydides as a reaction to the crisis of the Pelopon-
nesian War that swept the whole of the Greek world, or Machiavelli as a reaction to the 
end of medieval Europe, or Morgenthau as a reaction to the catastrophes of the mid-20th 
century. Today, a number of scholars take inspiration in some classical realists to grapple 
with ‘the political and economic hegemony of liberalism’ [9, p. 443]. In all of these cases, 
realism has presented itself as a sober reminder of the ‘realities’ of politics and an antidote 
to approaches (liberal/‘utopian’) that ‘neglect’ those ‘realities’. Writing in the wake of the 
end of the Cold War, and well before Chandler, Michael Loriaux gives us an example of 
how sceptical themes within realism can be taken into account. Loriaux explored St. Au-
gustine’s influence on realism and its relevance for analyzing the complexities of politics 
after the Cold War. Loriaux’s message is that realist scepticism should be analyzed much 
more thoroughly at a time when the left ideas of revolution have been severely thwarted, 
but also when ‘the bourgeois’s faith in the goodness of markets is anything but triumphant’ 
[17, p. 418]. Basically, this is a very similar call to that of resilience-thinking, that is, a call 
to go beyond both the old Left ideas and neoliberalism.
Ontology
Resilience-thinking, we are told by Chandler, grapples with ‘ontological complexity’ 
[7, p. 63]. Throughout Chandler’s book, ‘Complex Life’ is opposed to ‘Liberal’ conceptions: 
‘complex life’ is ‘non-linear’, not ‘linear’, ‘concrete’, not ‘abstract’, and ‘real’, not ‘artificial’, 
among other things [7, p. 64]. ‘Complex Life’ also implies ‘plurality’, not ‘singularity’ [7, 
p. 64]. Such dichotomies, however, sound very much like the familiar terms in which real-
ists have traditionally criticized ‘liberals’/‘utopians’. The pathos of realism has consisted 
precisely in its longing for grasping the real, the complex, the concrete of political life. 
Realists have criticized liberals precisely for being simplistic and abstract about politics, of 
trying to regulate politics through ‘artificial’ institutions. They have accused liberalism of 
attempting to bring the plurality of politics, especially international politics, under a single 
political principle. This kind of discussion is, indeed, a reedition of the first Great Debate 
in IR theory.
This is connected to further interesting philosophical parallels in how both resil-
ience-thinking and realism conceive of politics and power. Largely, both approaches are 
ontologically immanent, i. e. they stress processes and self-organization within society in 
general (resilience) and within politics (realism), whereby there is no external point to 
which society and politics can be subjected. Society and politics consist in interactions 
and self-organization of a plurality of powers.
For Chandler, ‘there is no outside to an interactive… world’ [7, p. 65]; not only soci-
ety, but ‘the world itself operates on the basis of autonomous self-activity and self-repro-
duction’ [7, p. 63]. Hierarchies of governance are flattened [7, p. 64–65]. Governance is 
possible only ‘through’ the activities of ‘agency’ and ‘life’, not ‘over or against’ these activi-
ties [7, p. 41, 65]. Genuine governance is connected to ‘constituent multiplicity’ of concrete 
people, not to artificial ‘constituted structures’ above the people [7, p. 64–65]. In good 
postmodernist fashion, resilience-thinking privileges ‘the political’ over ‘politics’: the for-
mer is the more ‘real’, foundational and changing power of the subjects, whereas the latter 
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is the more ‘formal’, ‘fixed’, ‘artificial’ ‘power over’ them (see [7, p. 59–60]). The former 
refers to ‘the power which really exist[s] in life itself ’, the latter to ‘liberal’ politics of formal 
institutions [7, p. 60]. Quite logically, the fundamental plurality of the political should not 
and cannot be depoliticized, reduced to a single, universal principle (see, e. g., [24]). To be 
sure, in describing these views of the political, Chandler refers to such postmodernist au-
thorities as Heidegger, Gilles Deleuze, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, or Ernesto La-
clau and Chantal Mouffe (see [7, p. 59–61]). No mention of realism is made, as elsewhere. 
What are, then, the parallels with realism? At first sight, since realism focuses on the 
(formal) institution of the state, it would be opposed to resilience-thinking. Yet, at least 
classical realists did not consider the state as the only possible political entity (see [9, 
p. 447–448]). More importantly, there are some philosophical parallels of principle. For 
realists, as is well-known, politics is a distinctive sphere of human life. And international 
politics, besides being a distinctive sphere, is also the one whose defining feature is the 
plurality of sovereign powers. It is constituted by this plurality. As a rule, no single power 
or unproblematic principle exists over and above these competing powers, their interests 
and visions. Even if a hegemon arises due to its overwhelming power, it weakens sooner 
or later. Again, there is no ‘outside’ or ‘above’ to this picture of international politics; there 
are only powers and their relations. This is, for the realist, the political reality. Accordingly, 
this reality should be governed keeping its nature in mind. This is a reality that can be gov-
erned only from within and through its potentialities. It cannot be governed, again, with 
the help of ‘formal’, ‘artificial’ liberal institutions and principles built above the real politi-
cal plurality of the powers. If some aspects of this reality are to be changed, they can only 
be changed taking into account the existing power relations. To repeat, what matters most 
here is the realist philosophical stress on the plurality of powers, not their more concrete 
historical recognition that states have been the main powers. The logic of realism may well 
accommodate pluralism of different kinds of powers, be they states or other entities, even 
competing interests within a state, as I note below. It is pluralism per se that matters, not its 
interstate historical manifestation. And this makes realism logically similar to resilience-
thinking, which clearly has a broad vision of social pluralism. 
Power in realism is not seen in a negative light only. If pursued appropriately, power 
produces balance and moderation (for classical realists) or even more substantive ethi-
cal virtues (e. g., for Thucydides). In this view of power, realism is strikingly similar to 
postmodernism. For the latter, particularly for Foucault, power, which is an integral con-
stituent of social life, may be positive in creating subjectivities and guaranteeing their 
pluralism (see [27, p. 31–32]). And according to a leading student of realism, for example, 
‘Morgenthau’s realism attempts to recognize the centrality of power in politics without 
reducing politics to violence’ [14, p. 633]. Just as postmodernists see in the plurality of 
powers a potential for pluralism and an antidote against depoliticisation, some classi-
cal realists (at least) championed ‘a politics of plurality and critical judgment’ [9, p. 446] 
and ‘an open and critical sphere of public political debate’ [14, p. 633]. Recall that, for 
Morgenthau, balance of power was applicable to both international politics and domes-
tic politics, including the logic of checks and balances. The thrust of balance of power 
was precisely to uphold political pluralism [28, p. 125–129; see also 9, p. 446–447]. Much 
like resilience-thinking, which is connected to philosophical pragmatism, classical real-
ism was also linked to pragmatism in that both largely focused on ‘the question of how 
to save the creative potential of democracy from the stifling homogeneity of modernity’ 
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[16, p. 784]. Indeed, Morgenthau may be read through much the same oppositions of the 
political and politics mentioned above in connection to resilience. And it can be shown 
that Morgenthau developed, even if partly, a sensitivity to the political and was critical 
of depoliticisation [19]. When relating a postmodern resilience-thinking to realism, it is 
telling to note that we can find, at least, in some of the classical realists ideas closer to the 
political left rather than to conservatism (see this feature noted by William Scheuerman 
in [9, p. 451, note 4]).
At the centre of resilience-thinking is complexity. It implies unpredictability and 
unintended consequences that cannot be comprehended through the old rationalism. 
Chandler uses some developments in the sciences to uphold his view. We find predictable 
references to quantum physics, especially Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle [7, p. 24]. He 
also refers to the work of biologist Stuart Kauffman to justify the idea that ‘the “real” of 
complex emergent life’ defies attempts to grasp its complexity with the help of human 
reason [7, p. 33]. 
However, such an approach is neither new nor alien for realism. In a book by Mor-
genthau written over seventy years ago, we find passages typical of classical realists which 
oppose the old hubris of reason and the reality of society. The former is ‘always simple, 
consistent, and abstract’, whereas the latter ‘is always complicated, incongruous, and con-
crete’ [26, p. 16]. There is no ‘simple, rational, mechanical’ ‘magic formula’ to comprehend 
the ‘complicated, irrational, incalculable’ politics [26, p. 86]. What is even more interesting 
is that, while this book by Morgenthau is rightly seen as sceptical, he also used the natural 
sciences to criticize the old certainties of rationalism. Thus, Morgenthau was quick to refer 
to the discoveries of relativity and of quantum indeterminacy for much the same purposes 
as Chandler does: for justifying his understanding of politics as complex and limited in its 
knowability [26, p. 116]. Using some scientific advances is thus not an exclusive province 
of resilience-thinking or other ‘trendy’ approaches. This was done even by the philosoph-
ically-minded classical realists. The same trend was explicitly and widely developed in 
neorealist works. Robert Jervis’s book on complexity has already been mentioned [22]; in 
the same vein, Thomas Czerwinski stressed nonlinearity [29]. Randall Schweller used the 
notion of entropy to back up his realist account of politics [30]. In Jervis, for example, we 
find much the same language as in resilience-thinking: an emphasis on ‘nonlinear rela-
tionships’, emergent qualities of systems, and ‘unintended’ outcomes [22, p. 6].
If we turn to realist views of history, as well as those in resilience-thinking, it is clear 
that both approaches are far from what they take as linear liberal philosophies of history. 
Resilience-thinking privileges ‘becoming’ over ‘being’, and ‘contingency’ over ‘certainty’ 
[7, p. 64]. Realists’ theories of history are varied, to be sure. Sometimes, they have leaned to 
stating ‘laws’ of history. But on the other hand, some classical realists were deeply sceptical 
about the possibility of formulating any logic of the unfolding of history. They emphasized 
contingency and thoroughgoing change (see [31]). In any case, the common denominator 
for most realists is that history has largely consisted in essentially unchanging competi-
tion for survival and/or power among the plurality of changing powers. So, at any rate, the 
realist ‘skepticism regarding the prospects for durable political improvement’ [17, p. 418] 
is opposed to what it takes to be linear — logical and progressive — views of history. 
There is also an element of order to complexity in both resilience-thinking and real-
ism. Chandler writes that ‘complex life is neither ordered nor chaotic’: it ‘is… generative of 
self-governing order’ [7, p. 20]. Complexity is characterized by ‘autopoiesis’ [7, p. 64]. Yet, 
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realists may reply that balance of power provides quite an analogous mechanism for order 
under the condition of anarchy, and that sometimes a hegemon may also order an inter-
national system. In any case, whatever the factors of order in the realist picture, they are 
immanent to the international politics: order is produced from within the system by the 
dynamics of power relations, and can be changed only using the existing potentialities of 
the system. Jervis states similar things about order, only in the language of systems theory: 
‘individual actors following simple and uncoordinated strategies can produce aggregate 
behavior that is complex and ordered’ [22, p. 7]. 
Epistemology 
Both resilience-thinking and much of realism are opposed to universalist, abstract 
formulations of knowledge. For both, the subject and object of knowledge are largely in-
separable. Knowledge is understood in line with pragmatic philosophy. It can only be 
limited and contextual. At the same time, such view of knowledge does not prevent both 
resilience-thinking and realism from offering their own, quite general theories of politics. 
This kind of epistemology is readily apparent in resilience-thinking, but its identi-
fication with realism may be counterintuitive. Realism is often associated with precisely 
opposite features, i. e. positivist statements of universal laws. However, this picture of real-
ism is one-sided; it rather applies to the more simplistic writings of some realists and to 
their explicit appearance of positivism. But in many prominent realist works, one finds an 
epistemology that is more similar to resilience-thinking.
Chandler’s understanding of resilience opposes the modernist separation between 
subject and object in general [7, p. 6–9]. This has evident consequences for epistemol-
ogy, i. e. that the knower and the known cannot be clearly separated. This is, of course, 
a received wisdom among postmodernists. But it was present in realism, especially of 
some classical realists. For example, Morgenthau did not at all see the social scientist as 
detached from the social context. In some places, he put a very strong emphasis on how 
far social conditions influence the scholar, including the substantive aspects of his or her 
studies [26, p. 136–144]. And while the entanglements of the knower and the known were 
especially strong in the social world, Morgenthau probably saw them in the natural sci-
ences, too. This is suggested by at least his reference to quantum physics, where there is a 
fundamental interdependence of the subject and the object of knowledge. 
Morgenthau, along with other scholars who migrated from Europe to the US (such 
as Hannah Arendt or Herbert Marcuse), was largely sceptical toward positivism. If he 
acknowledged the connectedness of the subject and the object of knowledge, then, logi-
cally, he also acknowledged the ethical responsibilities of the scholar, especially in the 
social sciences. Following Max Weber, Morgenthau certainly argued for an autonomy of 
scholar from politics, but, as we have seen, such autonomy was possible to a quite limited 
extent given the social influences on the scholar, as the anti-positivist fragments from 
Morgenthau referred to above make clear. Moreover, that relative autonomy of the scholar 
from politics did not at all mean indifference toward values in politics and the actions of 
the powerful. Quite the opposite: for Morgenthau, active political and social engagement 
of the scholar was vital (see [32, p. 267–268]). The scholar should try to be autonomous 
from power precisely to be in a position to act as a ‘judge of power’ [32, p. 267, italics in 
the original].
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I have already mentioned the connections of both resilience-thinking and realism 
with philosophical pragmatism. This also has an evident bearing on their epistemologies. 
Within the resilience perspective, knowledge can only be ‘concrete rather than abstract’, 
‘resilience-thinking lends itself to action-research methods engaging with actors in the 
situation, rather than to expert knowledge’ of liberalism or neoliberalism [7, p. 41–42]. 
Now compare this with Morgenthau’s following statement, which is, by the way, not from 
his early, most anti-positivist writings, but from a much later period. Morgenthau wrote: 
‘all great political theory… has been practical political theory… that intervenes actively 
in a concrete political situation with the purpose of change through action’ (cited in [33, 
p. 439]). Realism has traditionally stressed pragmatic aspects and has been implicated in 
practical policy-making. One may of course like or dislike some of realism’s connections 
to political practice, but one cannot ignore them. 
Chandler also teaches us ‘that all knowledge can only be local, contextual and time 
and place specific’ [7, p. 42]. Chandler presents this as ‘the reality of the world’ [7, p. 42]. 
But many of the classical realists were also characterized by their ‘rejection of absolute 
truths in politics’ [9, p. 446]. Such picture of knowledge, especially social, was drawn by 
Morgenthau in some of his writings (see in particular [26]). There, knowledge is always 
circumscribed. Recall, once again, that Morgenthau characterized politics as ‘concrete’, 
‘incongruous’, ‘incalculable’. Morgenthau did not, of course, develop this contextual view 
of knowledge to its extreme, largely because he sometimes wanted to make of realism itself 
a theory capable of comprehending politics at all times and in all places. But still, we do 
find in him at least a potentially contextual epistemology. It was not ‘a rigid epistemology, 
a suprahistorical structure of explanation’, not a kind of essentialism, but ‘an appreciation 
of the spatio-temporal contingencies’ and ‘the historically determined, and thus contin-
gent, nature of all social and political thought’ [19, p. 368, note 68, p. 369, 372]. It is these 
contextual aspects of epistemology in Morgenthau that it would be more interesting to 
take into account, if only because they have been for too long overshadowed by the more 
‘objective’ and universalist aspects of his works. 
What is especially worth noting is that the classical realist emphasis on the limits to 
knowledge was also kept in neorealism. Neorealists’ reliance on mathematics and the sci-
ences should not lead us to assume that they tried to theorize ‘the objective reality’. Con-
trary to their image, many of them did not. For instance, Kenneth Waltz continued the 
traditional ‘tension between realism and science’ in the sense that he rejected positivism 
as a scientific method [20, p. 14–15]. Instead, Waltz’s understanding of science implied ‘the 
interdependence of theory and fact’ (cited in [20, p. 15]). Or take Jervis’s work on com-
plexity. He believes that there are limits that theorizing about politics cannot overcome. 
For one thing, these limits relate to the specificities of society as consisting of human 
beings. People have ‘beliefs’, ‘guile and idiosyncracies’ [22, p. 4]. But Jervis also justifies 
the limits to knowledge by an argument from systems theory. He notes that, in general, 
the predictability of systems is often circumscribed; ‘[m]any systems, including inanimate 
ones, are highly complex and contingent’ [22, p. 4]. What we have in Jervis is an interesting 
combination typical of neorealists. That is, there is still the traditional realist stress on the 
complexity of human beliefs, of individual particularities and of human shrewdness that 
admit of no fully rational comprehension. Such a view has been present in realism prob-
ably from its very beginnings in the antiquity. But now, this traditional view is backed up 
by the scientific language, in this case by systems theory.
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Yet, Jervis makes another typical realist move. He claims that despite the above-men-
tioned complexity and contingency, he is able to identify some patterns in the systems. In 
good realist fashion, he claims that ‘the Cold War resembled the rivalry between Athens 
and Sparta’, and he even writes about ‘parallel processes in realms as diverse as interna-
tional politics and ecology’ [22, p. 5] (this parallelism between society and ecology is, of 
course, widespread in resilience-thinking). Realism has traditionally claimed to compre-
hend a few essential patterns that cut across all politics and history, however complex and 
contingent politics and history might be declared by realists themselves. In this, realism is 
again similar to resilience-thinking. Both approaches offer quite general theories of how 
the world ‘really’ works. The irony is that both realism and resilience-thinking pretend to 
be the best approaches available to get to a complex ‘reality’, although both have themselves 
described this reality as to a large extent unknowable. 
Resilience-thinking and realism: some common strengths and problems
We have thus identified some philosophical affinities between the two seemingly very 
different theories, resilience-thinking and realism. Both approaches may be related to a 
broad tradition of thought that has for centuries stressed the complexity, plurality and 
unpredictability of human affairs, and the challenges this poses to understanding and 
controlling them. These questions have always been relevant. More specifically, both resil-
ience-thinking and realism (since long before) have presented themselves as alternatives 
to modernity’s ‘liberal’, ‘idealist’, ‘formalist’, ‘abstract’, ‘optimistic’ ideas. 
It is probable that, currently, world politics has indeed reached a degree of complexity 
unseen before, and scholars have developed tools for analysing it that are also unprec-
edented. In this light, taking into account the novel resilience-thinking (as analyzed by 
Chandler and others) seems highly topical. But remembering some traditional aspects of 
realism also appears relevant. In many respects, both realism and resilience-thinking have 
offered penetrating critiques of simplistic, optimistic approaches that are inapplicable to 
today’s world, and perhaps have never been justified. 
An important advantage of both realism and resilience-thinking has been the recog-
nition of the plural aspect of politics and of political knowledge. Accordingly, both theo-
ries have opposed any attempts to simplify them, to impose a depoliticising closure on 
discussion in politics or in political science. 
Nevertheless, this should not mean that any discussion is desirable. Not all view-
points are equally reasonable, and pluralism in the absence of some reasonable criteria for 
their comparison may lead to destructive conflict and arbitrariness. Therefore, coming to 
the problems of resilience-thinking (at least as analyzed by Chandler) and realism, the first 
one is related to the elements of relativism in both. Both have a largely subjective under-
standing of rationality. Certainly, rationality cannot be understood in a dogmatic fashion 
either. Yet, there is no need to choose between the two equally vulnerable alternatives of 
relativism and dogmatism. There are many more refined understandings of rationality, 
and the growing complexity of the world is no obstacle to applying them. Quite the op-
posite, today’s complexity calls not for surrendering at the discretion of full arbitrariness 
and unknowability, but for finessing our rationality further and applying it to resilience-
thinking. Chandler himself alerts us to the fact that resilience-thinking should not lead to 
giving up the idea that there are at least some knowable regularities in the world. If there 
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were complete arbitrariness and unknowability, then there would be no genuine freedom 
or meaning in the world for human beings (see [7, p. 185–186, 197–198, 224] see also [10, 
p. 420–421]). This is an old, mostly Kantian theme in philosophy: if there were no at least 
some common criteria of truth (which are of course developing), there would be a risk 
that they would be replaced by ‘natural necessity’ or arbitrary political coercion. To be 
sure, many advocates of realism and of resilience-thinking are opposed to such kind of 
arbitrariness and unknowability. But the problem is that some of their approaches might 
be used to give arbitrariness and unknowability an appearance of reality. 
Secondly, there is a tension in resilience-thinking and realism, which is that both the-
ories stress complexity and contingency, but then set out to offer some broad and largely 
unhistorical categories to grasp those complexity and contingency. This contradiction is 
characteristic of subjectivist approaches. On the one hand, they emphasize plurality and 
limits to knowledge, but on the other, they claim that it is they that ‘know better’ than oth-
ers what reality is. Certainly, most other theories also somehow conceive of ‘reality’. Yet, 
resilience-thinking and realism are distinctive in that they intentionally and repeatedly 
stress their own ‘realistic’ features and denounce other approaches as ‘unrealistic’, ‘artifi-
cial’, and the like. Resilience-thinking insists on complexity and the challenges it poses for 
coherent knowledge and policy, but still presents itself as the best way to know what ‘real 
life’ is and how governance is possible ‘through’ such life. Similarly, the tension in realism 
has been between highlighting complexity and contingency and at the same time search-
ing for fixed categories that would explain the essential things about politics in all places 
and at all times (such as ‘power’ or ‘anarchy’)3. Related to this is that such broad categories 
as ‘complexity’ or ‘power’ become vague, and verge on truism/unfalsifiability. 
Approaches that pretend to get to the core of ‘reality’ are easily used to silence al-
ternative approaches as ‘unrealistic’, ‘artificial’ etc. There is, of course, a certain politics 
around who knows reality ‘better’ than others. This is a common criticism against realism, 
i. e. for pretending to be more ‘realistic’ than all other approaches. But to the extent that 
resilience-thinking also claims to know best what the very real life is, this criticism is also 
applicable to it. Both approaches should, then, be used with a kind of intellectual modesty, 
a modesty which can also be found in these very approaches because they themselves 
show how knowledge is difficult. 
But possibly, both realism and resilience-thinking may be used as a political weapon 
even when they put a bigger emphasis on complexity and contingency. That is, they can be 
used as claiming that they are the best policy options under the conditions of complexity 
and unpredictability because they just somehow know their way about those complexity 
and unpredictability. The seasoned realist politician may typically pretend that he or she 
just feels better the practicalities of politics: while there can be no clear knowledge about 
the complex politics, he or she is the best person to cope with its vicissitudes. Here arise 
the issues of the politician’s accountability and mistakes. But the same may be true of a 
resilience-thinking discourse in politics when it is presented as the best approach which 
somehow knows better how to cope with the unpredictable aspects of politics  — and 
which is not responsible for failures because some failures always happen under complex-
ity (for close criticisms by Chandler himself, see [7, p. 225–226]).
3 Schmidt thinks a similar dilemma between the complexity of the world and the requirements of 
governance exists in neoliberalism (see [10, p. 412–415]), but discussing her approach to neoliberalism is 
beyond the scope of our work.
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The third, related, range of problems is connected to the opposition between ‘real-
ity’ and ‘artifice’. As noted above, resilience-thinking opposes ‘the reality of complex life 
against the artifice of human social construction’ [7, p. 204]. There is, thus, a dichotomy 
between ‘reality/life’ and an ‘artificial’ sphere of formal politics, taken to be ‘liberal’. A 
similar dichotomy may be found in realism. This is, of course, connected to such old op-
positions as nature/culture, reality/appearance and the like. While this is not a place to 
elaborate on them, it is evident that these oppositions are largely simplistic and obsolete. 
Nobody seems to have defined in strict terms what the ‘natural’ and ‘the real’ are in poli-
tics. There has of course been a traditional romantic theme which links the ‘natural’ with 
escaping from the ‘artificial’ civilization and living like ‘noble savages’. There have also 
been traditional linkages, in some philosophers, between the real and the present, or the 
real and the plural. However, all such approaches ignore other important aspects of politi-
cal reality itself. It may be claimed that it is quite ‘natural’ for the zoon politikon to create 
institutions, that ideals are part of political reality, as are cooperation and integration. 
Theories that pretend to have uncovered the ‘reality’ and the ‘nature’ of politics and call 
for a return to them from an ‘artificial’ sphere of institutions misunderstand the fact that 
those institutions are indeed an essential part of social reality in the first place. Much of 
realism (since long ago) and resilience-thinking have been blamed for accepting and reify-
ing, even embracing a ‘reality’ of permanent danger, emergency and crisis, a ‘reality’ that 
they not only assume, but may help reinforce and perpetuate (see also [10, p. 406–408; 34, 
p. 419–421]).
It seems therefore that both realism and resilience-thinking may work in two differ-
ent modes: (1) a politicizing/critical mode and (2) a depoliticizing/uncritical one. The first 
stresses plurality. The second, however, claims to have the best access to ‘the reality’, uses 
fixed categories, reinforces unaccountable power and reifies a ‘reality’ of permanent crisis.
The EU’s turn to resilience-thinking and realism
The European Union has been the most influential international actor that has re-
cently elevated resilience to the status of one of its overarching foreign policy goals. On 
the other hand, the EU’s external action has rarely been considered using the potential of 
realism to its full; the EU has often seemed to be opposite to and inexplicable for realism 
(see also [9, p. 442, 444–445]). This makes it challenging — but promising — to apply the 
above comparison between resilience-thinking and realism to the EU’s case. As I will try 
to show, it is possible to connect the EU’s turn to resilience and realism. And this is fruit-
ful, as this will contextualize the EU’s policies on resilience and relate them to the age-old 
themes explored within and around realism. Such analysis will help to uncover potential 
problems of EU policies common to both realism and resilience-thinking.
Since the adoption of the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS), resilience has become one of 
the ‘priorities’ guiding all of its external action [5, p. 18, 23–28]. In the same context, the 
EU’s discourse has increasingly invoked themes that are close to the realist thinking. It is 
clear that the EU’s practice, as any other political practice, cannot be a simple continuation 
of theory, either that of resilience or realism. Still, these theories are reflected in large part 
in the EU’s practice and are useful for understanding it. 
The EU’s optimism has subsided significantly. Among the EUGS’s opening state-
ments are: ‘We live in times of existential crisis’, ‘Our Union is under threat’; the world is 
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said to be ‘difficult, more connected, contested and complex’ [5, p. 13]. According to the 
main architect of the EUGS, Nathalie Tocci, ‘[t]he term “resilience” was chosen as a prior-
ity for two reasons’, one of which ‘is that it reflected the notion of principled pragmatism’ 
[35, p. 70]. ‘Principled pragmatism’ is connected to combining ‘a realistic assessment of 
the strategic environment’ and ‘an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world’, and to 
‘engag[ing] the world manifesting responsibility towards others and sensitivity to contin-
gency’ [5, p. 16]. Of course, the connections between resilience, on the one hand, and the 
EU’s reduced ‘optimism’, the discourse of ‘crisis, complexity and a sense of uncertainty’, 
on the other hand, have been recognized in the literature [25, p. 7]. Also, resilience’s rela-
tions with ‘principled pragmatism’ have been explored (besides Tocci above, see [25; 34, 
p. 415–416]). 
Unfortunately, however, those who have examined these themes have engaged with 
realism in a rather fragmentary way, at best. Ana Juncos, for instance, simplistically op-
poses principles and pragmatism in an either/or fashion, and thus reproduces the dead-
locked norms-interests dichotomy once again [25, p. 2, 14–15]. She also seems to reduce 
realism to a ‘state-centric’ approach concerned with ‘stability’ and ‘security’, and she in-
sists ‘that resilience is not a realist or neo-realist strategy as understood in International 
Relations theory’ [25, p. 12]. Yet, as was argued below, realism need not be reduced to 
any of these features only. At its deepest, realism has been for ages concerned precisely 
with how to combine pragmatic considerations and principles, while recognizing that this 
combination is extremely complicated. Juncos’s own discussion of the relations between 
pragmatism and principles might have gained, had she paid more attention to insights 
accumulated during the centuries of realist thought. Ironically, Juncos does ‘rediscover’ 
basically realist themes, yet they are never systematically related by her to realism. Thus, 
referring to Sven Biscop, she writes about ‘a turn to “Realpolitik” ’ (in the original sense of 
the term coined by Ludwig von Rochau) [25, p. 11]. Juncos also notes the EU’s stress on 
‘responsibility’ and ‘responsible engagement’ (see [5, p. 17]) that cannot, of course, guar-
antee perfect results but that are still preferred to ‘passivity’ [25, p. 9–10]. Finally, Juncos 
agrees that principled pragmatism is associated with a stress on consequences and with 
what we can consider as a Weberian ethic of responsibility (see [25, p. 11]). It is clear that 
all these themes — i. e., how to engage actively and responsibly with the world, however 
imperfect it may be — have long been central to realism.
Other authors note that, in terms of discourse, ‘the EU has increasingly started think-
ing about power and competition and in increasingly realist terms’ and that it has empha-
sized the importance of ‘geopolitical considerations’ [36, p. 3]. Cristian Nitoiu and Monika 
Sus call the EUGS ‘the most strategic document the EU has ever had’ [36, p. 11]. However, 
their approach risks equating realism with ‘material power capabilities and geopolitics’ 
[36, p. 4], while realism is not only about material power, let alone geopolitics.
André Barrinha has so far been the only author who consistently applied the ide-
as of some classical realists to the EU’s current external action. Namely, Barrinha used 
what William Scheuerman called ‘[p]rogressive realism’, which is exemplified by Niebuhr, 
Morgenthau or John Herz, but also can include those contemporary scholars who revive 
‘the theoretical, political and philosophical sophistication of these classical authors’ [9, 
p. 442–443]. Unfortunately, Barrinha did not analyze the final text of the EUGS and made 
no reference to resilience.
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Now, relating resilience-thinking and realism seems to offer us some substantive in-
sights for studying the EU. Analyses of the EU’s turn to resilience need not necessarily be 
detached from realism. Instead of reinventing the wheel, we can gain from contextualizing 
the discussion and relating it to the age-old disputes within and around realism. It should 
be clear that I do not see either resilience-thinking or realism as the best approach in 
descriptive or normative terms. As we have seen, both have strengths and problems. My 
point is that reflecting on them allows us to better reflect on the prospective strengths and 
problems of the EU’s external action itself. 
The important insights of both resilience-thinking and realism identified above re-
volve around their critiques of simplistic, optimistic approaches and their stress on the 
plural aspect of politics. Clearly, the EU’s discourse has been moving from its previous 
optimistic universalist conceptions to the recognition of more complex realities. This rec-
ognition is indeed important for the EU now, given the numerous external and internal 
challenges it is facing. But the successfulness of any actor always depends, almost by defi-
nition, on how ‘realistic’ it is. The problem, of course, consists in defining what it means 
to be ‘realistic’ in practice. 
Resilience-thinking obviously privileges plurality in politics. And for realism, as Bar-
rinha reminds us, ‘the need for plurality’ (of interests) is important at the international 
and domestic levels, reflecting both ‘the diversity of national interests’ and ‘the internal 
plurality of a given political entity’ [9, p. 446]. At the international level, this stress on plu-
ralism may prompt the EU to take more into account the specificities of other players and 
the need for compromise with them (see also [9, p. 446–447]). According to Chandler and 
most other theorists, resilience refers to the internal development of every specific system; 
transformation ‘needs to come from within; resilience cannot be “given” or “produced” 
by outside actors’, whose leverage over other societies is limited [37, p. 277] (see also [34, 
p. 424; 25, p. 4]). The EU’s discourse partly reflects this recognition; it states that ‘[r]esil-
ience is context-specific, and requires tailor-made approaches’ [6, p. 23], and that it ‘will 
support different paths to resilience to its east and south’ [5, p. 25].
But the theme of plurality is also important for the internal processes within the EU 
itself. The heterogeneity and contestation which are characteristic of the EU mean that 
different conceptualizations of resilience may be expected to evolve within it and influence 
its external action. From a realist perspective, a genuine ‘grand strategy’ could soften the 
EU’s internal ‘democratic deficit’, because such a strategy would imply ‘a process of perma-
nent self-reflection and critique’ on the EU’s policies within it [9, p. 449]. 
On the other hand, the problems of both resilience-thinking and realism identified 
above also point to practical problems the EU may face. The first range of problems con-
cerns the elements of relativism in both. In normative terms, the plurality that we have 
explored above contains little in terms of substantively rational criteria which could show 
which actors the EU should accommodate for the sake of compromises, and which it 
should not. There is a slippery slope from pragmatism and contextual morality to cyni-
cism, which has long been clear to the critics of realism and which is relevant for the cur-
rent discussion on resilience. The EU may indeed become subject to ‘more criticisms of 
self-interest, selectivity and double standards’, which will thwart its ‘normative’ image and 
thus also the effectiveness of its policies [25, p. 2].
The second range of problems revolves around the contradiction in realism and re-
silience-thinking between the modesty of assuming limitations to knowledge and their 
74 Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2019. Т. 12. Вып. 1
claim to be ‘more realistic’ than other approaches. Both realism and resilience-thinking 
raise the problem of how governance is possible when the world has been declared to a 
large degree beyond understanding and control. This contradiction will likely play out be-
tween the EU’s respect for pluralism and attempts to impose its own templates. Despite its 
discourse, the EU may still be tempted to promote its fixed understanding of resilience as a 
single ‘correct’ one. Or it may simply view resilience as a more ‘realistic’ (and cheaper) new 
instrument to promote its old universalist agenda. This agenda, as many authors show, 
has not been entirely abandoned (see, e. g., [25; 34]). Resilience thus may lose its critical 
potential and be used in a depoliticized/uncritical mode as a mere tool for an uncritical 
and unreflective promotion of the EU’s norms. However, in either case, this will provoke 
concerns on the part of external actors. And this will hardly be realistic in the end, given 
that resilience cannot be brought ready-made to other societies. Moreover, the uncritical 
use of resilience will mean not only that the EU will not heed the critical voices of external 
actors, but also that its internal democratic deficit will exacerbate as it will not listen to 
domestic critiques of and be accountable for its policies on resilience.
Finally, both realism and resilience-thinking may be used to assume as self-evident 
and unchanging a reality of permanent crisis, thus foreclosing the possibilities for coop-
eration and change. This may serve as an excuse for the EU to give up attempts at compro-
mises and at the resolution of the root causes of social problems. Blame for these problems 
will be laid on their victims themselves. This will be thus an excuse for the EU’s lack of 
responsibility, both internationally and internally (see also [34, p. 419–421]).
Conclusion
We have identified some affinities between resilience-thinking, as analyzed by David 
Chandler, and political realism. The stress of resilience, as a novel conception, on the com-
plexity of the contemporary world is very important, yet, it is possible and indeed useful 
to contextualize it and relate it, if in part, to the age-old concerns of the realist tradition. 
Some of the strengths and problems that we identified in resilience-thinking and real-
ism show that both may be used in two modes, a politicizing/critical and a depoliticizing/
uncritical one. In the first mode, the theme of plurality and modesty will be foregrounded, 
as discussed when we noted the strengths of these approaches. In the second mode, resil-
ience-thinking and realism will suffer from the weaknesses that we discussed as the sec-
ond and the third range of problems, which deal with the claim to know the ‘reality’ best, 
the use of fixed categories, the irresponsibility, and the reification of an understanding of 
reality as a permanent crisis. The identification of these two modes is not surprising. They 
largely coincide with two broad strands that we find in both the literature on resilience 
and on realism. Resilience is understood either as an uncritical/depoliticizing ideology 
or as a notion that may be used in various ways, including critical/politicizing. Realism 
is also subject to either criticisms as an apologia of power and stasis, or to more nuanced 
approaches that find critical/politicizing elements in it. In this article, we have tried to ap-
proach both resilience-thinking and realism as rich theories that, at least potentially, have 
strengths. But, of course, the criticisms addressed to them cannot be ignored, as these the-
ories risk being used in an uncritical/depoliticizing mode, including in political practice.
Moreover, we have identified another vulnerability in both theories. It concerns ele-
ments of relativism discussed as the first range of problems. Even if resilience-thinking (at 
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least as analyzed by Chandler) or realism are used in a critical/politicizing mode stressing 
pluralism, they offer few substantively rational criteria for deciding which actions it is 
normatively acceptable — and indeed realistic in the long run — to take, and which it is 
not. To be sure, many advocates of realism and resilience will sincerely choose the accept-
able and effective course, but their approaches will still be subjective. Both approaches risk 
therefore being used in attempts to transform pluralism into destructive conflict and/or 
normative arbitrariness. And the subjective/relativist elements in both also make it very 
hard to predict how they will be used in political practice, as the EU’s example will likely 
show in the future. We may only explore general problems and prospects that will likely 
emerge in different scenarios, such as those that we outlined regarding the EU. 
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